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Abstract. Most of the existing password-based authenticated key exchange protocols have proofs either
in the indistinguishability-based security model of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (BPR) or in the
simulation-based of Boyko, MacKenzie, and Patel (BMP). Though these models provide a security level
that is sucient for most applications, they fail to consider some realistic scenarios such as participants
running the protocol with dierent but possibly related passwords. To overcome these deciencies, Canetti
et al. proposed a new security model in the universal composability (UC) framework which makes no
assumption on the distribution on passwords used by the protocol participants. They also proposed a new
protocol, but, unfortunately, the latter is not as ecient as some of the existing protocols in BPR and
BMP models. In this paper, we investigate whether some of the existing protocols that were proven secure
in BPR and BMP models can also be proven secure in the new UC model and we answer this question in
the armative. More precisely, we show that the protocol by Bresson, Chevassut, and Pointcheval (BCP)
in CCS 2003 is also secure in the new UC model. The proof of security relies in the random-oracle and
ideal-cipher models and works even in the presence of adaptive adversaries, capable of corrupting players
at any time and learning their internal states.
1 Introduction
Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols allow users to securely establish a
common key over an insecure channel only using a low-entropy, human-memorizable, secret key called
a password. Since PAKE protocols do not require complex public-key infrastructure (PKI) or trusted
hardware capable of storing high-entropy keys, they have become quite popular since being introduced
by Bellovin and Merritt [3].
Due to the low entropy of passwords, PAKE protocols are subject to dictionary attacks in which
the adversary tries to break the security of the scheme by trying all values for the password in the small
set of the possible values (i.e., the dictionary). Unfortunately, these attacks can be quite damaging
since the attacker has a non-negligible probability of succeeding. To address this problem, one should
invalidate or block the use of a password whenever a certain number of failed attempts occurs. However,
this is only eective in the case of online dictionary attacks in which the adversary must be present
and interact with the system in order to be able to verify whether its guess is correct. Thus, the goal
of PAKE protocol is restrict the adversary to online dictionary attacks only. In other words, o-line
dictionary attacks, in which the adversary veries if a password guess is correct without interacting
with the system, should not be possible in a PAKE protocol.
Security Models. Even though the notion of password-based authentication dates back to the
seminal work by Bellovin and Merritt [3], it took several years for the rst formal security mod-
els to appear in the literature [5,4]. In [5], Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (BPR) proposed an
indistinguishability-based security model extending the framework of Bellare and Rogaway [7,8] while,
in [4], Boyko, MacKenzie, and Patel (BMP) proposed a simulation-based security model based on the
framework of Shoup [18]. In both cases, the level of security provided by the models is quite reasonable
and sucient for most applications and it captures the intuition given above in which the success of
an adversary in breaking the security of a scheme should be limited to its online attempts.
Unfortunately, as pointed out by Canetti et al. [10], the BPR and BMP security models are not
as general or as strong as they could be and they fail to consider some realistic scenarios such as
participants running the protocol with dierent but possibly related passwords. To overcome these
deciencies, Canetti et al. [10] proposed a new security model for PAKE schemes in the universal
composability (UC) framework [9] which makes no assumption on the distribution on passwords used
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by the protocol participants. Their model was later extended to the verier-based scenario by Gentry
et al. [13].
In addition to the new security model, Canetti et al. [10] also proposed a new protocol based
on the PAKE schemes by Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung [15] and by Gennaro and Lindell schemes [12]
and proved it secure in the new model against static adversaries based on standard computational
assumptions. Unfortunately, the new protocol is not as ecient as some of the existing protocols in
BPR and BMP models (e.g., [2,1,15,17]), an issue that can signicantly limit its applicability. Given
this limitation, one natural question to ask is whether some of the more ecient protocols that were
proven secure in BPR and BMP models can also be proven secure in the model of Canetti et al. [10].
In this paper, we answer this question in the armative by showing that the protocol by Bresson,
Chevassut, and Pointcheval (BCP) [2] is also secure in the model of Canetti et al. [10]. We view this
as the main contribution of our paper.
In addition to proving the security of the BCP protocol in the model of Canetti et al. [10], an-
other contribution of our paper is to show that their protocol remains secure even against adaptive
adversaries, capable of corrupting adversaries at any time and learning their internal states. Despite
this being rst time that such a strong security level is achieved in the password-based scenario, we
do not consider this result very surprising given the use of the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models
in the security proof.
Organization. In Section 2, we extend the ideal functionality of PAKE protocols to include client
authentication, which not only ensures the parties that nobody else knows the common secret, but
also that they actually share the same secret. As in [10], passwords are chosen by the environment
who then hands them to the parties as input. This is the strongest security model, since it does
not assume any distribution on passwords. Furthermore, it allows the environment to even make
players run the protocol with dierent (possibly related) passwords. For example, this models a user
mistyping a password. As in [10], we also provide the adversary with a Test-Password query to model
the vulnerability of the passwords (whose entropy may be low). This models the case in which the
adversary tries to impersonate a player by guessing its password. If the guess is correct (which may
happen with non-negligible probability), the adversary should succeed in its impersonation.
Next, in Section 3, we recall the password-based protocol of [2] and prove it secure in the new
extended model, even against adaptive adversaries which can perform strong corruptions at any time.
The proof is given in Section 4. As we mentioned above, this is the rst time that such a strong
security level is achieved in the password-based scenario: adaptive and strong corruptions in the UC
framework.
In the appendix, we also provide ideal functionalities for the ideal-cipher and the random-oracle
models [6].
2 Denition of Security
Notations. We denote by k the security parameter. An event is said to be negligible if it happens with
probability that is less than the inverse of any polynomial in k. If G is a nite set, x
R   G indicates
the process of selecting x uniformly and at random in G (thus we implicitly assume that G can be
sampled eciently).
The UC Framework. Throughout this paper we assume basic familiarity with the universal com-
posability framework. Here we provide a brief overview of the framework. The interested reader is
referred to [9] for complete details. In a nutshell, security in the UC framework is dened in terms
of an ideal functionality F, which is basically a trusted party that interacts with a set of players to
compute some given function f. In particular, the players hand their input to F which computes f
on the received inputs and gives back to each player the appropriate output. Thus, in this idealized
setting, security is inherently guaranteed, as any adversary, controlling some of the parties, can only
learn (and possibly modify) the data of corrupted players. In order to prove that a candidate protocol3
 realizes the ideal functionality, one considers an environment Z, which is allowed to provide inputs
to all the participants and that aims to distinguish the case where it receives the outputs produced
from a real execution of the protocol (involving all the parties and an adversary A, controlling some
of the parties and the communication among them), from the case where it receives outputs obtained
from an ideal execution of the protocol (involving only dummy parties interacting with F and an ideal
adversary S also interacting with F). Then we say that  realizes the functionality F if for every (poly-
nomially bounded) A, there exists a (polynomially bounded) S such that no (polynomially bounded)
Z can distinguish a real execution of the protocol from an ideal one with a signicant advantage. In
particular, the universal composability theorem assures us that  continues to behave like the ideal
functionality even if it is executed in an arbitrary network environment.
Session ID's and Player's IDs. In the UC framework there may be many copies of the ideal
functionality running in parallel. Each one of such copies is supposed to have a unique session identier
(SID). Every time a message has to be sent to a specic copy of F, such a message should contain
the SID of the copy it is intended for. Following [10], we decided to make things simple and to assume
that each protocol that realizes F expects to receive inputs that already contain the appropriate SID.
See [10] for further details about this. Moreover we assume that every player starts a new session of
the protocol with input (NewSession, sid, Pi, Pj, pw, role), where Pi is the identity of the player, pw
his or her password, Pj the identity of the player with whom he or she intends to share a session key
and role being either client or server.
UC With Joint State. The original UC theorem allows to analyze the security of a system viewed
as a single unit, but it says nothing if dierent protocols share some amount of state and randomness
(such as a common reference string, for instance). Thus for the application we have in mind, the UC
theorem cannot be used as it is, since dierent sessions of the protocol share the same random oracles
and the same ideal cipher.
In [11] Canetti and Rabin introduced the notion of universal composability with joint state. In-
formally, they put forward a new composition operation that allows dierent protocols to have some
common state, while preserving security. Very informally, this is done by dening a multisession ex-
tension ^ F of F, which basically runs multiple executions of F. Each copy of F is identied by means
of a sub-session id (SSID). This means that, if ^ F receives a message m with SSID ssid it hands m to
the copy of F having SSID ssid. If no such copy exists, ^ F invokes a new one on the spot. Notice that,
whenever ^ F is executed, the calling protocol has to specify both the SID (i.e. the usual session id, as
in any ideal functionality) and the SSID.
Adaptive Adversaries. In this paper, we will consider protocols that are secure against adaptive
adversaries, i.e. adversaries that are allowed to arbitrarily corrupt players at any moment during the
execution of the protocol. The adversary corrupts a player by getting complete access to its internal
memory. Note that at the end of an execution of the protocol, the adversary recovers nothing, as if
the internal state has been completely erased. In a real execution of the protocol this is modeled by
letting the adversary A obtain the password and the internal state of the corrupted player. Moreover,
the adversary can arbitrarily modify the player's strategy. In an ideal execution of the protocol, the
simulator S gets the player's password and has to simulate its internal state, in a way that remains
consistent to what already provided to the environment.
The Random Oracle and the Ideal Cipher For lack of space, a description of these functionalities
is given in Appendix A.
The Password-Based Key-Exchange Functionality With Client Authentication. In this
section, we motivate and present our formulation of an ideal functionality for password-based key
exchange with client authentication (see Figure 1). The starting point for our approach is the denition
for universally composable password-based key exchange with no authentication [10]. Our aim is to
dene a functionality that achieves the same eect, except that we also incorporate the authentication
of the client. Mutual authentication would have been easier to model. However, client-authentication
is usually enough in most cases and often results in more ecient protocols.4
First notice that the functionality is not in charge of providing the password(s) to the participants
(the client Alice and the server Bob). Rather we let the environment do this. As already pointed out
in [10], such an approach allows to model, for example, the case where some users may use the same
password for dierent protocols and, more generally, the case where password(s) are chosen according
to some arbitrary distribution (i.e. not necessarily the uniform one). Moreover, notice that allowing
the environment to choose the password(s) guarantees forward secrecy, basically for free.
The queries NewSession and TestPwd are dealt with in the same manner as in [10], but we introduce
the client authentication in the way the functionality answers the NewKey queries. In the denition
of FCA
pwKE, the server receives an error if the players don't meet all the conditions to receive the same,
randomly-chosen key. We could have chosen to send to the server a pair consisting of a key chosen
independently from that of the client and a ag warning the server that the protocol has failed, but
we preferred to keep the functionality as straightforward as possible.
Client Authentication. The rst reason why the initial functionality didn't achieve this property
is that we had to deal with the order of the queries NewKey. More precisely, if the server asks the
rst query, it is impossible to answer it, because we don't know what is going to happen to the client
afterwards: If the session was fresh for both players and the server was the only one to have received
his key, the client's session could possibly become compromised or interrupted after the server had
received his key, whereas the functionality should have been able to determine whether or not the
server should receive a key or an error message. We solved this issue by making it mandatory for the
adversary to ask the query for the server after the corresponding query for the client. This is not a
strong restriction, since this situation frequently happens in real protocols, and in particular in the
one that we are studying: the server has to accept the client before generating the session key.
Thus, if the adversary asks for the key of a client, everything is as before, except that we also
provide a ag ready for the session. The aim of this ag is to help determine, when the adversary asks
for the key of the server, that the corresponding client has already got her key.
On the other hand, if the adversary asks for the key of a server, the server is given an error message
in the easy failure cases (interrupted or compromised sessions, corrupted players { if the passwords are
dierent in the two latter cases). If the session is fresh and the corresponding client hasn't yet received
her key, we simply postpone the query of the adversary until the client has received her key. In the
latter case, when the client has received her key, the server is given the same key if they have the same
password and an error message otherwise. We nally obtain the following denition, which remains
trivially secure and correct.
3 Our Scheme
3.1 Description of the Protocol
The protocol presented in Figure 2 is based on that of [2], with two slight dierences: In the standard
model using the security denition of Bellare et al. [5], the session identier is obtained at the end of
the program execution as the concatenation of the random values sent by the players; in particular,
it is unique. In contrast, in the model of universal composability [9], these identiers are uniquely
determined in advance, before the beginning of the protocol. Thus, this dierence must be taken care
of in the denition of the protocol. Another dierence has been made, in order to match the denition
of the functionality: in case of a failure, the server receives an error message, this feature guaranteeing
the client authentication.
3.2 Security Theorem
We consider here the Theorem of Universal Composability in its joint-state version. Let b FCA
pwKE be
the multi-session extension of FCA
pwKE and let FRO and FIC be the ideal functionalities that provide
a random oracle and an ideal cipher to all parties. Note that only these two functionalities belong to
the joint state.5
{ F
CA
pwKE owns a list L initially empty of values of the form (Pi;Pj;pw).
{ Upon receiving a query (NewSession;ssid;Pi;Pj;pw;role) from Pi:
 Send (NewSession;ssid;Pi;Pj;role) to S.
 If this is the rst NewSession query, or if it is the second NewSession query and there is a
record (Pj;Pi;pw
0;role) 2 L, then record (Pi;Pj;pw;role) in L and mark this record fresh.
{ Upon receiving a query (TestPwd;ssid;Pi;pw
0) from the adversary S:
If there exists a record of the form (Pi;Pj;pw;role) 2 L which is fresh, then do:
 If pw = pw
0, mark the record compromised and reply to S with \correct guess".
 If pw 6= pw
0, mark the record interrupted and reply to S with \wrong guess".
{ Upon receiving a query (NewKey;ssid;Pi;sk) from S, where jskj = k:
If there is a record of the form (Pi;Pj;pw;role) 2 L, and this is the rst NewKey query for Pi, then:
If role=client:
 If the session is compromised, or if one of the two players Pi or Pj is corrupted, then send (ssid;sk) to Pi,
record (Pi;Pj;pw;client;completed) in L, as well as (ssid;Pi;pw;sk;client;status;ready) (with status being
the status of the session at that moment).
 Else, if the session is fresh or interrupted, choose a random key sk
0 whose length is k and send (ssid;sk
0)
to Pi. Record (Pi;Pj;pw;client;completed) in L, as well as (ssid;Pi;pw;sk
0;client;status;ready) where
status stands for fresh or interrupted;
If role=server:
 If the session is compromised, if one of the two players Pi or Pj is corrupted, and if there are two records
of the form (Pi;Pj;pw;server) and (Pj;Pi;pw;client), set s = sk. Otherwise, if the session is fresh and
there exists any recorded element of the form (ssid;Pj;pw
0;sk
0;client;fresh;ready), set s = sk
0.
 If pw = pw
0, send (ssid;s) to Pi record (Pi;Pj;pw;server;completed) in L, as well
as (ssid;Pi;pw;s;server;status).
 If pw 6= pw
0, send (ssid;error) to Pi, record (Pi;Pj;pw;server;completed) in L, as well
as (ssid;Pi;pw;server;error;status).
 If the session is fresh and there doesn't exist any recorded element of the form
(ssid;Pj;pw
0;sk
0;client;fresh;ready), then do not do anything;
 If the session is interrupted, then send (ssid;error) to player Pi, and record in L
(Pi;Pj;pw;server;completed) and (sid;Pi;pw;server;error;interrupted).
Fig.1. Functionality F
CA
pwKE: it is parametrized by a security parameter k. It interacts with an adversary S and a set of
parties P1,...,Pn.6
Theorem 1 The above protocol securely realizes ^ FCA
pwKE in the (FRO;FIC)-hybrid model, in the pres-
ence of adaptive adversaries.
Client U Server S
x
R   [[1; q   1]] y
R   [[1; q   1]]
(U1) X   g
x U;X
      !
(S2) Y   g
y
Y
   Essidkpw(Y )
S;Y 
        KS   X
y
(U3) Y = Dssidkpw(Y
)
KU   Y
x
Auth   H1(ssidkUkSkXkY kKU)
skU   H0(ssidkUkSkXkY kKU)
completed
Auth       !
(S4)
if (Auth = H1(ssidkUkSkXkY kKS))
then skS   H0(ssidkUkSkXkY kKS)
completed
else error
Fig.2. Client-authenticated two-party password-based key exchange
4 Proof of Theorem 1
4.1 Description of the Proof
In order to show that the protocol UC-realizes the functionality FCA
pwKE, we need to show that for
all environments and all adversaries, we can construct a simulator such that the interactions, from
the one hand between the environment, the players (say, Alice and Bob) and the adversary (the real
world), and from the other hand between the environment, the ideal functionality and the simulator
(the ideal world), are indistinguishable for the environment.
In this proof, we incrementally dene a sequence of games starting with the real execution of
the protocol and ending up with game G6, which we prove to be indistinguishable from the ideal
experiment.
Since we have to deal with adaptive corruptions, we consider dierent cases according to the number
of corruptions that have occurred up to now. G0 is the real world. In G1, we start by explaining how
S simulates the ideal cipher and the random oracle. Then, in G2, we get rid of such a situation in
which the adversary wins by chance. The passive case, in which no corruption occurs before the end
of the protocol, is dealt with in G3. Next, we completely explain the simulation of the client in G4,
whatever corruption may occur. As for the server, we divide it into two steps: We rst show in G5 how
to simulate the last step of the protocol, and then we simulate it from the beginning in G6. G7 sums
up the situation, and is shown to be indistinguishable from the ideal world.
Note that these games are sequential and built on each other. When we say that a game consider
a specic case, one has to understand that in all other cases, the simulation is dealt with as described
in the former game.
We rst describe two hybrid queries that are going to be used in the games. The GoodPwd query
checks whether the password of a certain player is the one we have in mind or not. The SamePwd query7
checks if the players share the same password, without disclosing it. In some games the simulator has
actually full access to the players. In such a case, a GoodPwd (or a SamePwd) can easily be implemented
by simply letting the simulator look at the passwords. When the players are entirely simulated, S will
replace the queries above with a TestPwd and with a NewKey, respectively.8
We say that a ow is oracle-generated if it was sent by an honest player and arrives without any
alteration to the player it was meant to. We say it is non-oracle-generated otherwise, that is either if
it was sent by an honest player and modied by the adversary, or if it was sent by a corrupted player
or a player impersonated by the adversary.
4.2 Proof of Indistinguishability
Game G0: Real Game. G0 is the real game in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models.
Game G1: Simulation of the oracles. Here we modify the previous game by simulating the hash
and the encryption/decryption oracles, in a quite natural and usual way.
For the ideal cipher, we allow the simulator to maintain a list " of entries (queries, responses) of
length q" + qD. Such a list is used by S to be able to provide answers which are consistent with the
following requirements. First, if the simulator receives twice the same question for the same password,
it has to give twice the same answer. Second, the simulator should make sure that the simulated scheme
(for each password) is actually a permutation. Third, in order to help the simulator to later extract
the password used in the encryption of Y  in the rst ow, there should not be two entries (question,
answer) with identical ciphertext, but dierent passwords. More precisely, " is actually composed of
two sublists: " = f(ssid;pw;Y;;E;Y )g [ f(ssid;pw;Y;;D;Y )g. The rst (resp. second) sublist
is used to indicate that the element Y (resp. Y ) has been encrypted (\E") (resp. decrypted (\D")) to
produce the ciphertext Y  (resp. Y ) via a symmetric encryption algorithm that uses the key ssidkpw.
The role of  will be explained below. The simulator manages the list through the following rules:
{ For an encryption query Essidkpw(Y ) such that (ssid;pw;Y;;;Y ) appears in ", the answer
is Y . Otherwise, choose a random element Y  2 G = G n f1g. If a record (;;;;;Y )
already belongs to the list ", then abort, else add (ssid;pw;Y;?;E;Y ) to the list.
{ For a decryption query Dssidkpw(Y ) such that (;pw;Y;;;Y ) appears in ", the answer is Y .
Otherwise, choose a random element ' 2 Zq
 and evaluate the answer Y = g'. If (;;Y;;;)
already belongs to the list ", abort, else add (ssid;pw;Y;';D;Y ) to the list.
The two abort-cases will be useful later in the proof: when one sees a ciphertext Y , it cannot have
been obtained as the encryption with two dierent passwords, but a unique one.
In addition, the simulator maintains a list H of length qh. This list is used to properly manage the
queries for the random oracles H0 and H1. In particular, the simulator updates H using the following
general rule (n stands for 0 or 1).
{ For a hash query Hn(q) such that (n;q;r) appears in H, the answer is r. Otherwise, choose a
random r 2 f0;1g`Hn. If (n;;r) already belongs to the list H, abort, else add (n;q;r) to the
list.
Due to the birthday paradox, G1 is indistinguishable from the real game G0.
Game G2: Case where the adversary wins by chance. This game is almost the same as the
previous one. The only dierence is that we allow the simulator to abort if the adversary manages to
guess Auth without having asked a corresponding query to the oracle. This happens with negligible
probability so that G2 and G1 are indistinguishable.
Game G3: Passive Case: No Corruption Before Step 4. In this game, we deal with the passive
case in which no corruption occurs before step 4. We give the simulator some partial control on the
players involved in the protocol. In particular, we assume that the simulator is given oracle access to
each player, for the rst three rounds of the protocol. Then in S4, if no corruption occurred, we require
S to completely simulate their behavior. More precisely, during this game, we consider two cases. If
no corruption occurred before S4, we require S to simulate the execution of the protocol on behalf9
of the two players. If, on the other hand, some party has already been corrupted before starting S4,
the simulator does nothing. Notice that, in any case, we still allow S to know the passwords of both
players.
If at the beginning of S4, the two players are still honest and all the ows were oracle-generated,
the simulator asks a SamePwd query. Notice that, since we are assuming that S knows both passwords,
this boils down to verify that both passwords are actually the same.
Now we distinguish two cases. If the two passwords are the same, S chooses a random key K (in
the key space) and \gives" K to all players. Otherwise, S chooses a random key and gives it to the
client whereas the server just receives an error message.
Notice that, if the two players have the same password, such a strategy makes this game indistin-
guishable with respect to previous one. If, conversely, the players do not have the same passwords, an
execution of the protocol in this game is indistinguishable from a real execution except for the risk of
collision, which is negligible. This is because, if the two players do not share the same passwords, the
server will end-up computing a dierent Auth, thus getting an error message, with all but negligible
probability. Hence G3 and G2 are indistinguishable.
Game G4: Simulation of the Client From the Beginning of the Protocol. In this game, we
let S simulate the non-corrupted client from the beginning of the protocol, but we don't allow him to
have access to her password anymore. The simulation is done as follows. In S1, the client chooses a
random x and sends the corresponding X to the server. In S3, if she is still honest, then she doesn't
ask a decryption query for Y .
If all ows were oracle-generated, then she computes Auth with the oracle H0
1 private to the simu-
lator: Auth = H0
1(ssidkUkSkXkY ) instead of H1. A problem can occur if the server gets corrupted,
as we describe it more formally later on.
Otherwise, if the ow received by the client is not oracle-generated, we face two dierent cases:
{ If the server was corrupted sooner in the protocol, the simulator knows his password, or if the
Y  sent by the adversary in S2 has been obtained via an encryption query, then the simulator
recovers his password too (with the help of the encryption list). Then, when receiving Y , the
client asks a GoodPwd query for the functionality. If it is a correct guess, then S uses H1 for the
client, otherwise it uses its private oracle H0
1: Auth = H0
1(ssidkUkSkXkY ).
{ If the adversary has not obtained Y  via an encryption query, there is a negligible chance that
it knows the corresponding y and the client also uses H0
1 in this case. The event AskH can then
make the game to abort (we will bound its probability later on; simply note that it is negligible
and related to the CDH):
AskH: A queries one of the oracles H0 or H1 on
ssidkUkSkXkY kKU or ssidkUkSkXkY kKS, ie the common
value of ssidkUkSkXkY kCDH(X;Y )
We now show how to simulate the second part of U3 (the computation of skU). We need to separate
the cases in which the client remains honest, and those in which she gets corrupted.
{ If the client remains honest, she is given skU by a query to H0
0 if Auth was obtained by a query
to H0
1 and no corruption occurred, and by a query to H0 if Auth was obtained by a query to H1
or if Auth was obtained by a query to H0
1 and there was a corruption afterwards.
{ If she is corrupted during U3, A is given her internal state: the simulator already knows x and
learns her password; it is thus able to compute a correct Y . S then recomputes Auth by a query
to H1 (there is no need that this query gives the same value as the value previously computed by
the query to H0
1 since Auth has not been published) and the client is given sk by a query to H0.
If the two players are honest at the beginning of S4 and all the ows were oracle-generated, there
will be no problem as in the former game we prevented the server from computing Auth. If the server
gets corrupted after Auth has been sent, and if the passwords are the same, the simulator reprograms10
the oracles such that on the one hand H1(ssidkUkSkXkY kKU) = H0
1(ssidkUkSkXkY ) and on the
other hand H0(ssidkUkSkXkY kKU) = H0
0(ssidkUkSkXkY ). This programming will only fail if this
query to H1 or H0 has already been asked before the corruption, in which case the event AskH has
happened.
Finally, if the client is being corrupted, S does the same reprogramming.
Thus, omitting the events AskH, which probability will be computed later on, the games G4 and
G3 are indistinguishable.
Game G5: Simulation of the Server in the Last Step of the Protocol. In this game, we
let S simulate the non-corrupted server in step S4. More precisely, during this game, we consider two
cases. If no corruption occurred before S4 and all the ows were oracle-generated, the behavior of S
was described in G3. If, on the other hand, the client has already been corrupted before starting S4,
or if a ow was non-oracle-generated, the simulation is done as follows.
If the client is either corrupted or impersonated by the adversary who has decrypted Y  to obtain
the Y sent in Auth, then the server recovers the password used (by the corruption or by the decryption
list) and he veries the Die-Hellman sent by the client. If it is correct, then the simulator asks a
GoodPwd query for the server (otherwise, the latter is given an error message). If the password is
correct, then the server is given the same key as the client; otherwise, he is given an error message.
If the client is impersonated by the adversary who has sent anything else, we abort the game. This
happens only if it has guessed Y by chance, which happens with negligible probability.
Finally, if the server is corrupted during S4, the adversary is given y and Y . More precisely, the
simulator recovers the password of the server and gives something consistent with the lists to A. Thus,
G5 and G4 are indistinguishable.
Game G6: Simulation of the Server from the Beginning of the Protocol. In this game, we
let S simulate the non-corrupted players from the beginning of the protocol. We have already seen
how S simulates the client. The simulation, for a non-corrupted server, is done as follows.
In S2, the server sends a random Y  (chosen without asking the encryption oracle). If he gets
corrupted, the simulator recovers his password, and can then provide the adversary with adequate y
and Y with the help of the encryption and decryption lists. The simulation of S4 has already been
described.
G6 is indistinguishable from G5, since if the two players remain honest until the end of the game,
they have the same key depending on their passwords and nothing else in G3. And the case in which
one of the two gets corrupted has been dealt with in the two former games, and the execution doesn't
depend on the value of Y , recalling that the encryption is G ! G such that there is always a plaintext
corresponding to a ciphertext.
Game G7: Summary of the Simulation and Replacement of the Hybrid Queries. Here
we modify the previous game by replacing the hybrid queries GoodPwd and SamePwd with their ideal
versions. If a session aborts or terminates, then S reports it to A.
Figure 3 sums up the simulation until this point and describes completely the behavior of the
simulator. At the beginning of a step of the protocol, the player is assumed to be honest (otherwise we
don't have to simulate him or her), and he or she can get corrupted at the end of this step. We assume
that U3 (1) has to be executed before both U3 (2) and U3 (3). But the two last can be executed in
either order. For simplicity, we assume later on that the order is respected.
We show that G7 is indistinguishable from the ideal game by rst recalling the only dierence
between G6 and G7: the GoodPwd queries are replaced by TestPwd queries to the functionality and
the SamePwd by NewKey ones. Say that the players have matching sessions if they share the same ssid,
have two opposite roles (client and server) and agree on the values of X and Y .
First, if the two players remain honest until the end of the game, they will obtain a random key,
both in G7 and IWE (the ideal game), as there are no TestPwd queries and the sessions remain fresh.
We need to show that a honest client will receive the same key as a honest server in G7 if and only
if it happens in IWE. We rst deal with the case of client and server with matching sessions. If they11
Client Server Simulation
U1
honest
honest
random x, X = g
x
adversary
gets corrupted
honest
reveal x to A
adversary
S2
honest
honest random Y

adversary
honest
gets corrupted
learn pw
compute y and Y via decryption query
reveal X;y;Y to A adversary
U3 (1)
honest
honest
no decryption query on Y

adversary
gets corrupted
honest learn pw
compute y and Y via decryption query
reveal x;X;Y to A adversary
U3 (2)
honest
honest use H
0
1 for Auth
adversary
GoodPwd(pw) false, use H
0
1
GoodPwd(pw) correct, use H1
if pw unknown, abort
gets corrupted
honest learn pw
compute y and Y via decryption query
reveal x;X;Y to A adversary
U3 (3) honest
honest use H
0
0 for Auth
adversary
GoodPwd(pw) false, use H
0
0
GoodPwd(pw) correct, use H0
S4
honest
honest
if SamePwd correct, then same key sk
if SamePwd incorrect, then error message
adversary
if pw unknown, then abort
if pw known, DH false, then error
if pw known, DH correct, GoodPwd(pw)
correct, then same key
if pw known, DH correct, GoodPwd(pw)
false, then error
Fig.3. Simulation and adaptive corruptions12
have the same password in G7, they will receive the same key: if they are honest, their key is given
to them from G3; if the client is honest with a corrupted server, they will receive their key from G4;
and if the client is corrupted, they will receive it from G5.
In IWE, the functionality will receive two NewSession queries with the same password. If both
players are honest, it will not receive any TestPwd query, so that the key will be the same for both
of them. And if one is corrupted and a TestPwd query is done (and correct, since they have the same
password), then they will also have the same key, chosen by the adversary.
If they don't have the same password in G7, the server will always be given an error. In IWE,
this is simply the denition of the functionality.
We now deal with the case of client and server with no matching sessions. It is clear that in G7 the
session keys of a client and a server in such a case will be independent because they are not set in any of
the games. In IWE, the only way that they receive matching keys is that the functionality receives two
NewSession queries with the same passwords, and S sends NewKey queries for these sessions without
having sent any TestPwd queries. But if the two sessions do not have a matching conversation, they
must dier in either X, Y  or Auth. The probability that they share the same pair (X;Y ) is bounded
by q2
"=q and thus negligible, q" being the number of encryption queries to the oracle.
If the client is corrupted until the end of the game, then in G7, the server recovers the password
and uses it in a TestPwd query to the functionality. If it is incorrect, he is given an error message,
and if it is correct, he is given the same key as the client (which was chosen by the simulator). This
is exactly the behavior of the functionality in IWE.
If the server gets corrupted, we still have a TestPwd query concerning the client in G7. If the
password is correct, the simulator chooses the key, otherwise it is the adversary. The same thing
happens in IWE.
4.3 Simulating Executions via the CDH Problem
As in [2], we compute the probability of event AskH with the help of a reduction to the CDH problem,
given one CDH instance (A;B). More precisely, AskH means that there exists one session in which we
replaced the random oracles H0 or H1 by H0
0 or H0
1 respectively and A asks the corresponding hash
query. We thus choose at random one session, denoted by ssid, and we inject the CDH instance in
this specic session. With probability 1=qs we have chosen the right session. In this specic session
ssid, we maintain a list B, and
{ the client sets X = A;
{ the server still chooses Y  at random, but the behavior of the decryption is modied on this specic
input Y , whatever the key is, but only for this session ssid: choose a random element  2 Zq

and compute Y = Bg, and store (;Y ) in the list B, as well as the usual tuple in ". If Y
already belongs in this list, one aborts as before.
Note that this only aects the critical session ssid and doesn't change anything else. Contrary to the
earlier simulation, we do not know the values of x and ', but they are not needed since the values
of KU and KS are no longer required to compute the authenticator and the session key: the event
AskH raised for this session (X;Y ) means that the adversary has queried the random oracles H0 or H1
on UkSkXkY kZ, where Z = CDH(X;Y ). By choosing randomly in the list H, we obtain this Die-
Hellman triple with probability 1=qh, where qh is the number of hash queries. We can then simply look
into the list B for the values  such that Y = Bg: CDH(X;Y ) = CDH(A;Bg) = CDH(A;B)A.
Note however that in case of corruption, we may need to reveal internal states, with x and ': If
the corruption happens before the end of U3, with the publication of Auth, there is no problem since
the random oracles will not be replaced by the private oracles, and then the guess for the session was
not correct, which contradicts the assumption of good choice. If the corruption happens after the end
of U3, with the publication of Auth, there is no problem either:13
{ the corruption of the client does not reveal any internal state, since she has completed her execu-
tion;
{ the corruption of the server leads to a \reprogramming" of the public oracles that immediately
raises the event AskH if the query had already been asked. We can thus stop our simulation, and
extract the Die-Hellman value from the list H, without having to wait the end of the whole
attack game.
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A The Random Oracle and the Ideal Cipher
In [10], Canetti et al. show that there doesn't exist any protocol that UC-emulates FpwKE in the plain
model (i.e. without additional setup assumptions). Here we show how to securely realize a similar
functionality without setup assumption but working in the random oracle and ideal cipher models
instead.14
Random Oracles. The random oracle functionality was already dened by Hofheinz and M uller-
Quade in [14]. We present it again in Figure 4 for completeness. It is clear that the random oracle
model UC-emulates this functionality.
The functionality FRO proceeds as follows, running on security parameter k, with parties P1,...,Pn and an adversary S:
{ FRO keeps a list L (which is initially empty) of pairs of bitstrings.
{ Upon receiving a value (sid;m) (with m 2 f0;1g
) from some party Pi or from S, do:
 If there is a pair (m;~ h) for some ~ h 2 f0;1g
k in the list L, set h := ~ h.
 If there is no such pair, choose uniformly h 2 f0;1g
k and store the pair (m;h) 2 L.
Once h is set, reply to the activating machine (i.e., either Pi or S) with (sid;h).
Fig.4. Functionality FRO
Ideal Cipher [16]. An ideal cipher is a block cipher that takes a plaintext or a ciphertext as input.
We describe the ideal cipher functionality FIC in Figure 5. Notice that the ideal cipher model UC-
emulates this functionality. Note that this functionality characterizes a perfectly random permutation,
by ensuring injectivity for each query simulation.
The functionality FIC takes as input the security parameter k, and interacts with an adversary S and with a set of
(dummy) parties P1,...,Pn by means of these queries:
{ FIC keeps a (initially empty) list L containing 3 tuples of bitstrings and a number of (initially empty) sets
Ckey;sid;Mkey;sid.
{ Upon receiving a query (sid;ENC;key;m) (with m 2 f0;1g
k) from some party Pi or S, do:
 If there is a 3 tuple (key;m;~ c) for some ~ c 2 f0;1g
k in the list L, set c := ~ c.
 If there is no such record, choose uniformly c in f0;1g
k   Ckey;sid which is the set consisting of ciphertexts not
already used with key and sid. Next, it stores the 3 tuple (key;m;c) 2 L and sets Ckey;sid   Ckey;sid[fcg.
Once c is set, reply to the activating machine with (sid;c).
{ Upon receiving a query (sid;DEC;key;c) (with c 2 f0;1g
k) from some party Pi or S, do:
 If there is a 3 tuple (key; ~ m;c) for some ~ m 2 f0;1g
k in L, set m := ~ m.
 If there is no such record, choose uniformly m in f0;1g
k   Mkey;sid which is the set consisting of plaintexts not
already used with key and sid. Next, it stores the 3 tuple (key;m;c) 2 L and sets Mkey;sid   Mkey;sid[fmg.
Once m is set, reply to the activating machine with (sid;m).
Fig.5. Functionality FIC